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ABSTRACT
Fake news has been considered one of the most challenging problems in the last few years. The
effects of spreading fake news over social media platforms are widely observed across the globe
as the depth and velocity of fake news reach far more than real news (Vosoughi et al., 2018). The
plan for the following dissertation is to investigate the mass spread of fake news across social
media and propose a framework to fight the spread of fake news by mixing preventive methods
that could hinder the overall percentage of fake news sharing. We plan to create a study on the
social network by recreating a complex adaptive system (CAS) that mimics a real social network;
then, we use agent-based modeling to simulate the flow of news sharing. Finally, we evaluate
appropriate governance policies and apply the appropriate ones to reduce the spread of fake news.
This dissertation contributes to online misinformation research in multiple areas: First, we present
a framework to fight fake news, which social media platforms and researchers interested in the
same domain can utilize. We propose that this framework allows it to be reproduced by any entity
that has a social network. Second, we present an agent-based modeling design of fake news
dissemination on a social network that can be used for fake news research that uses complex
systems properties. Finally, we aim to contribute our work in healthcare to analyze further fake
news related to the domain. Since much information attributed to cancer-related videos publicly
available on YouTube is surrounded by uncertainty, we aim to systematically find systematic
approaches that could reduce misinformation related to YouTube cancer videos.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
During the last few years, significant advancements in technology have made it possible to
generate content for a targeted mass of users. Some of these advancements raise a concern around
misinformation, specifically distinguishing factual information from fake information. Therefore,
it is likely that spillover effects of fake news on the perception of real information happen every
day. A particular action of misinformation that can potentially affect a large segment of social
networks is the planned and strategic design of fake news from news sources that gets disseminated
to a user’s news feed and other real news.
We make a distinction among several related concepts associated with noise as it pertains to
news: fake news, rumor, clickbait, misleading information, and satire/comedy (Rubin et al., 2016;
Tandoc et al., 2018; Waldrop, 2017). As described by (Lazer et al., 2018), the definition of fake
news is “fabricated information that mimics news media content in form but not in organizational
process or intent.” Many studies that focused on building fake news classifiers have looked into
fake news as a method of deception. For example, (Volkova & Jang, 2018) categorize deception
on social media into three types: Hoax, intended misinformation. The second type is Propaganda,
which persuades the user to follow a particular direction based on their emotion. Finally, the third
type is Disinformation, which is information intentionally fabricated for deception. In other words,
a user purposefully creates content, where the information other users share has been manufactured
as a genuine news article to deceive other users.
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While identifying fake news is undoubtedly essential, solving the challenge of reducing its
reach requires interventions to prevent widespread misinformation. Many recent studies in the
domains of computer science and information systems communities have addressed mitigation and
intervention strategies, as a recent survey by (Sharma et al., 2019) suggests. Prior work proposes
three mitigation and intervention strategies. One approach is to develop a “fake news classifier”
which a social media platform can deploy to detect fake news and remove it. Model development
and evaluation are usually performed by testing the classifier on existing “fake news datasets,” as
highlighted in (Pérez-Rosas et al., 2017). This intervention comes with the challenges of model
accuracy and data relevancy. A second strategy is to inject “true news” strategically into a network
to “de-contaminate” users who have been exposed to fake news (Nguyen et al., 2012). This
approach utilizes computational diffusion models such as the independent cascade model.
Evaluation is based on running an experimental simulation on a realistic social network and testing
different diffusion processes. Finally, the third approach uses the “competing cascades” approach
(Budak et al., 2011), where the counter to fake news is propagated strategically contemporaneously
as the fake news is propagating (unlike the previous strategy, which counters after the fact).
Evaluation is similar to the second approach described above.
Ideally, evaluation of fake news intervention strategies needs to be done with randomized field
experiments (Caplan et al., 1989) to compare scenarios with and without (or using an alternative)
interventions. However, randomized trials in the fake news literature are arduous due to ethical or
access issues. It may not be ethical to manipulate (fake) news and interventions in real platforms
with realistic scenarios. For instance, Twitter’s terms of use prohibit such experiments, even if an
IRB were to approve it.

2

We leverage agent-based models (ABMs) as an alternative because they permit customization
and launch of highly granular behavioral simulations with realistic settings, and parallel
simulations can almost mimic a randomized field experiment (Brainard et al., 2020; Kopp et al.,
2018). Prior work so far does not use ABMs to test different fake news mitigation strategies;
instead, it uses ABMs to test the impact of fake news on various outcomes, such as the effects of
echo chambers on viral misinformation by (Törnberg, 2018). Another study focuses on the impact
of spreading fake news on real-life scenarios such as a norovirus spread (Brainard et al., 2020).
Finally, a third study tests the effects of manipulative actors, even social bots, on changing the
public opinion on a subject (Ross et al., 2019).
Viewing social media as a system, agents such as users and news sources can all have potential
impacts on fake news spread, allowing different behaviors to be modeled as a Complex Adaptive
System (CAS). (Miller & Page, 2007) explain that for a complex adaptive system, ABM can offer
a balance between model flexibility and precision. It can also allow adaptive agent behavior and
inherent dynamics. The power of computation can put more agents and will enable the study to be
repeatable and recoverable. Therefore, (Törnberg, 2018) has found that agent-based modeling and
a complex system’s framework bring many advantages to the study of fake news.
Our contributions can be summarized in threefold: At first, chapter 2 discusses the first paper
that models fake news spread systematically, i.e., we attempt to simulate all possible scenarios that
could take place in reality which may have an impact on fake news spread. Secondly, it is the first
paper to study different fake news control policies on social media, and our study will suggest
effective policies that social media platforms can potentially implement. In our research, we plan
to investigate the effects of the individual on the micro-level on the overall distribution of fake
news in social networks on the macro level. The effects that happen on an individual level are
3

related to the individual’s ability to detect fake news, which can be implied from the features of
the news, such as how the user perceives the source of the news. The strength of the title of the
sentiment can be a factor of the individual’s decision on whether they accept the information to be
fake or real. This will ultimately influence the user's decision on whether they would like to share
the news within their own circle. In addition to the study on the individual choices made for sharing
news in the social network, we examine whether the social network can make impactful
adjustments that will help reduce the effects of spreading fake news. Finally, our research on
misinformation related to specific types of cancer-related videos contributes to finding the higher
quality of information that resides on popular social media platforms. This can also indirectly
contribute to improving patient education by ranking video recommendations in the best way
possible for the patient to avoid consuming unreliable information.

4

CHAPTER 2: FIGHTING MASS DIFFUSION OF FAKE NEWS
2.1. Background
During the last few years, significant advancements in technology have made it possible to
generate content for a targeted mass of users. Some of these advancements raise a concern
around misinformation, specifically distinguishing information from misinformation. A
particular action of misinformation that can potentially affect a large segment of social networks
is the planned and strategic design of fake news from news sources disseminated to a user’s news
feed and other factual information. Therefore, it is likely that spillover effects of fake news on
the perception of the news that happened occur frequently. Infocalypse is a recent term that has
been used to identify how people are increasingly unable to verify content they read, see, or hear
anymore due to the advances in fabricating news events (Stover, 2018).
We make a distinction among several related concepts associated with noise as it pertains to
news: fake news, rumor, clickbait, misleading information, and satire/comedy (Rubin et al.,
2016; Tandoc et al., 2018; Waldrop, 2017). Previous research defined fake news as “fabricated
information that mimics news media content in form but not in organizational process or
intent”(Lazer et al., 2018)[p. 1094]. Many recent studies focused on building classifiers to
distinguish misinformation have considered fake news a method of deception. For example,
recent research categorized deception on social media into three types: Hoax in intentional
misinformation. The second type is Propaganda, which persuades the user to follow a particular
direction based on their emotion. Finally, the third type is Disinformation, which is information
5

intentionally fabricated for deception (Volkova & Jang, 2018). In other words, a user
purposefully creates content where the information they share masquerades as a genuine news
article to deceive other users.
While identifying fake news is important, solving the challenge of reducing its reach requires
interventions to prevent widespread misinformation. As a recent survey suggests, many recent
studies in computer science and information systems communities have addressed mitigation and
intervention strategies (Sharma et al., 2019). Prior work proposes three mitigation and
intervention strategies. One approach is to develop a “fake news classifier” which a social media
platform can deploy to detect fake news and apply the appropriate policy. Previous efforts that
followed this strategy have carried out model development and evaluation testing the classifier
on known and existing “fake news datasets” (Pérez-Rosas et al., 2017). This intervention comes
with the challenges of model accuracy and data relevancy. A second approach injects highly
influential influencers that strategically spread less misinformation into a network to “decontaminant” users with high exposure to fake news (Nguyen et al., 2012). This approach
utilizes computational diffusion models such as the independent cascade model. Finally, the third
approach uses the “competing cascade” approach (Budak et al., 2011), where the counter to fake
news is propagated strategically contemporaneously as the fake news is propagating (unlike the
previous strategy, which counters after the fact). For this strategy, an experimental simulation
runs on a realistic social network and tests different diffusion processes. Another recent survey
have examined different ways fake news can be differentiated which were by fact checking, fake
news detection, or fake news propagation (Zhou & Zafarani, 2020).
Ideally, evaluating fake news intervention strategies needs to be carried out with randomized
field experiments (Caplan et al., 1989). One compares scenarios with and without (or using an
6

alternative) interventions. However, randomized trials in the fake news literature are arduous due
to ethical or access issues. It may not be ethical to manipulate fake news and interventions in real
platforms with realistic scenarios. For instance, Twitter’s terms of use (Twitter Terms of Service,
n.d.) prohibit such experiments, even if an IRB approved them.
We leverage agent-based models (ABMs) as an alternative because they permit
customization and launch of highly granular behavioral simulations with realistic settings, and
parallel simulations can almost mimic a randomized field experiment (Brainard et al., 2020;
Kopp et al., 2018). Prior work so far does not use ABMs to test different fake news mitigation
strategies; instead, it uses ABMs to test the impact of fake news on various outcomes, such as the
effects of echo chambers on viral misinformation (Törnberg, 2018). Another study focuses on
the effects of spreading fake news on real-life scenarios such as a norovirus spread (Brainard et
al., 2020). Finally, a third study tests the impact of manipulative actors, even social bots, on
changing the public opinion on a subject (Ross et al., 2019).
Viewing social media as a system, agents such as users and news sources can potentially
impact fake news diffusion, allowing a Complex Adaptive System (CAS) to model the different
behaviors. ABM can offer a balance between model flexibility and precision for a complex
adaptive system (Miller & Page, 2007). It can also allow adaptive agent behavior and inherent
dynamics. The power of computation can put more agents and enable the study to be repeatable
and recoverable. Therefore, agent-based modeling and a complex system’s framework bring
many advantages to analyzing fake news (Törnberg, 2018).
We summarize our contributions twofold: At first, this is the first paper that systematically
models fake news spread, i.e., we try to capture possible factors in the real world that may
impact spreading misinformation. Secondly, it is the first paper to study different fake news
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control policies on social media. Our study will suggest practical approaches which a social
media platform can potentially implement. We plan to investigate the effects of the individual on
the micro-level on the overall distribution of fake news in social networks on the macro level.
The news sharing effects that occur on an individual level are related to the individual’s ability to
detect fake news. The features of the news articles and networks can imply how the user
perceives the source of information. The strength of the sentiment title can be a factor in the
individual’s decision to accept the news to be fake or real. Ultimately, the combination of the
features will influence the user’s decision on whether they would like to share the information
within their circle. In addition to the study on the individual choices made for sharing news in the
social network, we examine whether the social network can make impactful adjustments to help
reduce the effects of spreading fake news.
2.2. Related Work
Most recent studies in IS or related fields examine the effects of fake news in an experimental
setting (Gimpel et al., 2021; Pennycook, Binnendyk, et al., 2021; Pennycook, Epstein, et al., 2021;
Pennycook et al., 2018). These efforts and many other similar ones have examined the effects of
fake news on the psychological level of the individual. On the other hand, only a handful of
research efforts have created a mass-scaled model to examine interventions (Brainard et al., 2020;
Burbach et al., 2019; Ross et al., 2019; Törnberg, 2018). Prior work on fake news diffusion
attributes two theories to the distribution of fake news. The first theory is that the “illusory truth
effect” significantly impacts the believability of news (Pennycook et al., 2018).
Furthermore, the study indicates that “social media platforms help to incubate belief in
blatantly false news stories and that tagging such stories as disputed is not an effective solution to
this problem.” Another behavioral theory is the silence of spiral theory (Ross et al., 2019), initially
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established by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann in 1974 (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). The theory suggests
that a group is likely to ostracize individual opinions that do not conform with the group’s
statement or the public view. In the two upcoming sections, we highlight relevant research efforts
that have reviewed fake news modeling on a mass scale using agent-based modeling methods in a
separate section, and we discuss the previous interventions applied to mitigate the effects of fake
news on social networks where we would like to propose our framework that can potentially model
these interventions. For the scope of this research project, we will model a few of the interventions
and compare them; however, we would like to share our code repository for future research efforts
to continue modeling other interventions.
2.2.1. Modeling Fake News using ABM
Brainard (Brainard et al., 2020) used ABM to find the effects of misinformation in health on a
norovirus outbreak. The study classifies social media news in healthcare as “good” or “bad”
advice. Then, the spread of information -and misinformation- is modeled along with disease as
two separate yet interactive processes. Törnberg (Törnberg, 2018) also represents fake news
sharing on social media as a contagion, focusing on echo chambers’ effect on viral misinformation.
Törnberg finds the presence of a synergistic effect between “opinion and network polarization on
the virality of misinformation.”
A recent study utilized agent-based modeling to examine individual personality traits and
network effects on disseminating fake news and real news (Burbach et al., 2019). The study finds
a stronger relationship between the density of the network and the dissemination of fake news than
individual traits. We argue that modeling the spread of fake news as a contagion is due to the
similarity of the network structures. The network structure is an exponential network with the
small-world property. The network has hubs introduced as echo chambers, and a small group of
9

people could quickly spread the virus or the wrong information across the whole network. Another
reason could be the eagerness of people to push information that might appear critical. A recent
study has shown that fake news spreads faster more profoundly than real news (Vosoughi et al.,
2018). Finally, the small-world property of the network resembles the ease of exposure to the virus.
In other words, social media feeds people information at ease based on the features of the news
article. Misinformation spreads when people are highly connected since it only takes a minimal
effort to scatter. Therefore, it is relatively easy for an attacker to sneak up on an extensive network.
2.2.2. Interventions to Fight Fake News Diffusion
Prior work on fake news interventions has a wide variety of approaches. In summary, we have
noticed a few trends in previous intervention methods. These methods are fact-checking by using
experts or the crowd, developing a fake news classifier, and incentivizing sharing factual news.
One of the interventions is mainly designed for creating a framework that incentivizes the
spread of factual news. For example, a recent study modeled the intervention combining
reinforcement learning and point processes (Farajtabar et al., 2017). The authors have modeled the
spread of misinformation by a Multivariate Hawkes Process (MHP) and formulated the fake news
mitigation problem into a reinforcement learning framework. The policy method is designed to
optimize the action rewards under budgetary constraints. Another research effort has mapped the
fake news diffusion problem into an MHP and modeled user bias and peer influence in a second
MHP (Goindani & Neville, 2019); the authors aim to increase the chance of spreading true news
among users who have been exposed to fake news. This assumes that augmented display of true
information will enhance the users’ ability to distrust fake news. Another approach uses the crowd
to identify stories that will be sent to fact checking to reduce the chances of misinformation (Kim
et al., 2018).
10

Another intervention approach that has been commonly addressed in prior research is the
development of fake news classifiers. Previous efforts have trained accurate classifiers tested on
Facebook datasets (Granik & Mesyura, 2017; Tacchini et al., 2017) and Twitter datasets
(Helmstetter & Paulheim, 2018; Jadhav & Thepade, 2019). A recent effort also compared
leveraging crowdsourcing vs. expert journalists to increase the model accuracy (Buntain &
Golbeck, 2017).
From our review of related work, we have noticed the absence of an agent-based modeling
framework that captures multiple network structures and multiple intervention strategies that can
fight fake news. Therefore, we aim to define our model to capture a general setting customized to
capture a specific trend in fake news diffusion and find the most appropriate strategy to reduce
fake news.
2.3. Method
Our methodology incorporates design science research (DSR) guidelines (Hevner et al., 2004) in
its design, development, implementation, and evaluation phases. We compare our problem in its
core as a long-lasting search process of improving the overall medium of social interaction on
online platforms accessed by millions of users to the set of issues that have used DSR in their
methodology, such as using DSR guidelines to build an identity value management model (Syed
et al., 2019). Therefore, we note a few of the DSR guidelines that have been defined and followed
in Information Systems (IS) research which would add to our contribution to IS research. First,
our methodology produces an artifact that can be leveraged to understand types of fake news
diffusion and implement several techniques to reduce the diffusion of fake news on a large social
media network, highlighting the first guidelines of DSR. Second, our problem, which is fighting
misinformation on a large scale, is highly relevant. The effects of misinformation on social media
11

are common and well-known in today’s world, which follows the second guideline of problem
relevance. Our technological solution is the agent-based model that would address this problem
and recreate the social media network providing many angles and alternatives that can be examined
in order to study intervention strategies. Our study does not only produce an artifact that can solve
a relevant problem, but it also contributes to IS research in fighting misinformation by providing
our ABM as a framework that can be extended in other studies which is a methodological
contribution to the areas of designing artifacts that can help fighting fake news. As for the guideline
on design evaluation, we followed a combination of statistical tests that compare the distributions
of multiple data points that are captured in the model with distributions that are either sampled
from real datasets or have been reported in prior research on a consistent basis. The evaluation
rigor is critical as it determines the expected behavior of the model components to be consistent in
alignment with the component design.
Our method creates a CAS that resembles real-life scenarios when users react to the news on
a social media platform. The agents are the social media platform users who respond to different
news articles from numerous news sources shared by other users. The news articles can be fake or
real. However, the simulation hides that information from the different agents by design to decide
whether the news article is fake or real. The users choose to share based on their characteristics
along with the news article attributes. A platform policy is distributing the news articles users
receive in their feed. We estimate these decisions by incorporating the essential features of fake
news classifiers found in previous literature.
As shown in Figure 1, our agent-based modeling contains four components: user behavior,
news features, network properties, and control policies, which will be the key factors affecting the
spread of fake news on social media. A given user on social media will be more willing to accept
12

and spread the word-aligned with their interests. It can potentially lead to evolving an “echo
chamber” in which most users share similar opinions. Some news, such as “the sun comes out
from the west,” is easy to judge to be fake for most users, while others are tricky.

Figure 1 Agent-Based Model Approach Overview

Our proposed agent-based model design defines the users and news channels as agents. The
users consume news articles and then determine if it is fake or real. They also decide whether they
would like to post the article and share it with their network. As for the news channels, the news
channels are to create content and distribute news. Since not all news channels are assumed to
adhere to high journalism standards, news channels are designed to have a certain threshold of
credibility as a source. News channels’ credibility will vary by intent as news channels could intend
to distribute fake news. However, both intent and credibility can be modeled by either parameter
13

since the relationship between a news channel’s credibility and creating false content is similar to
the relationship between a news channel’s intent and fraudulent content.
We design the social media site as a place that shares news articles from news channels. We
use the insights from our agent-based model to propose a governance framework for regulating
social media platforms to reduce or prevent fake news by utilizing rewards or penalties to hinder
the propagation of misinformation.
Figure 2 highlights the steps we take on every complete run. The figure only shows high-level
steps involved in running our simulation. In every new time step t which is also known as a tick,
news articles are generated in the simulation by news agencies. There are two significant decisions
the users make during every step. These decisions are whether the news article shared on their
news feed is fake or real and if the user wants to share it or not. The decisions made by each user
inherently affect others in the network, which makes the problem of understanding the mass effect
of fake news more complicated than a study on the individual level.
2.3.1. Agent-Based Model Design
In our design, we have accounted for assigning the user in a social network to be the more
common type of agent and the news agency to be another less common type of agent. Each agent
type has a different strategy. The news agencies want to maximize viewership and engagement
while the user wants to know the latest news from the platform. Each feature from the user, news
agency, or news article is generated through a corresponding distribution function simulation.
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Figure 2 Steps for Investigating Interventions to Fight Fake News

2.3.2. User Features
For the user, we have added a feature that determines the preferences for the user and assumes
that the user’s personal preference will be on a spectrum where the user on one extreme can be
fully in favor of the subject and on the opposite side of the spectrum can be completely opposing
it. The user can also have a neutral stand on the issue or a mild preference. For example, if we
were to create a simulation of financial news, then we assume that every node created in the
network is interested in economic news. The users and news sources that are not interested will
not be considered since both news sources and users are not involved in that subject and do not
express interest in participating. The primary use of this feature is to extend the theory of the
Illusory of Truth as the user will be likely to believe repetitive news shared in their circles if they
happen to share the same core preferences. Table 1 explains the main attributes and functions the
user has per our settings.
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Table 1 User Features – Fake News Diffusion General Model

Feature

Description

Range

Unique ID

A unique non-intelligent number

[0, size of network)

used to identify and track agents
Probability of sharing

A probability parameter set for

news

scaling whether the user is

A random number between [0,1]

actively sharing news to the
extent where the user is just
observing the news on their feed
User preference

A measure that resembles the

A number between [-1,1]

user’s approval or rejection

following the formula of

towards a specific topic

preference. We have set the

discussed on the news. It can be

formula in our simulation runs to

a political inclination, or it can

be:

be the users’ attitude towards
COVID-19 news.

Preference = Extremity *
Direction
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Table 1, (Continued)

User type

Articles

Specifies whether the user is a

One type from either ‘regular

regular user or a news agency

user’ or ‘news agency’

All the news articles that the user News articles stored in the user’s
has decided to share with their

collection where a user could

network

have shared a number between 0
articles and all news articles that
have been published

The setting of the simulation can modify the distribution function of user preferences. We
have chosen to model the distribution based on the extremity of preferences and direction in our
settings. The extremity of user preference in our settings has followed the Gaussian distribution.
Most users’ preferences are likely to be general and less extreme approval or disapproval as a
starting point. We selected this specific model because we wanted to begin the simulation with a
lightly polarized community. As for the direction of the user preference, we have chosen to
model it by following a Bernoulli distribution where a user either has a positive or negative
selection, even if it is a tiny one. Therefore, the expected distribution of user preferences from
the starting point of the simulation is to be two Gaussian distributions where each Gaussian has a
mean on either the positive or negative end of the preference dimension. The values of the mean
μ and standard deviation σ of the distribution can be altered for a more polarized network of
users or a less polarized network as well.
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𝐼𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠, 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠:
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 · 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
(𝑥−𝜇)2
1
−
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑔(𝑥) =
𝑒 2𝜎2
𝜎√2𝜋
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ℎ(𝑥) = 2 · (𝜇 𝑥 (1 − 𝜇)1−𝑥 ) − 1
After modeling user preferences, we use the choices of two connected users to measure the
difference between them to determine if a user will likely share a news article based on the
similarity with the other user. The difference between two users is computed by taking the
absolute difference between two users and comparing it to a random number parameter between
0 and 1. The user then would potentially share the news with similar users. We added the random
function to share the information with some random chance instead of sharing solely based on
similarity.
2.3.3. New Agencies
We model news agencies as a distinct type of user. They share the same attributes in Table 1;
however, news agencies have one added feature: reliability. We model reliability following a
Bernoulli distribution where μ corresponds to the overall news reliability expected in the
network.
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠′ 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠:
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝜇 𝑥 (1 − 𝜇)1−𝑥
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜇 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠
2.3.4. News Features
Table 2 contains a summary of the most important features we included for news articles. These
attributes are source credibility and news article context, which we derived from prior literature
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features that were significant in training fake news classifiers. As for source credibility, we use
the previous measure of source preference as a relative distance between the user’s and the
source’s preferences. Along with the source preference, we also use the article’s preference as a
secondary measure. Therefore, the user’s acceptance of a news article is inversely proportional to
the difference in source and article’s preferences from the user’s preferences.
Along with the source attributes, we also consider the features that are from the news article
itself. The features that we have found to be most commonly used to identify fake news when
training fake news classifiers are the title’s sentiment and the number of shares. An extreme
feeling embedded in the title signals that the news article is made for exaggeration.
1
△ 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 & 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
1
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 ∝
△ 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 & 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
1
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 ∝
| 𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 |
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 ∝ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 ∝

We use a Beta distribution where most news article headlines generally do not have an
extreme sentiment; however, there is a slight chance of a news headline having a high sentiment
score, whether it is a positive or negative sentiment. We also interpolate the Beta distribution to
assure that it is within the range of [1,5] and then use the Bernoulli distribution with a weight of
0.5 to assign the direction of the sentiment, whether it was a positive or negative sentiment. As
for the number of shares, we have used an Exponential distribution function to generate the total
number of shares for the news article.
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Table 2 News Article Features

Feature

News Article Id

Description

Range

A unique non-intelligent number

[0, total number of all news

used to identify and track news

articles)

articles
Source Id

A unique non-intelligent number

[0, size of network)

was used to identify and track the
agent whom the article originated
from
Source

A measure that resembles the

A number between [-1,1] following

Preference

source’s approval or rejection

the formula of preference. We have

towards a specific topic discussed

set the formula in our simulation

on the news.

runs to be:
Preference = Extremity * Direction

Article

A measure that resembles the

A number between [-1,1] following

Preference

article’s inclination towards a

the formula of preference. We have

specific topic discussed on the

set the formula in our simulation

news.

runs to be:
Preference = Extremity * Direction
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Table 2, (Continued)

Sentiment

A number that measures the

[-5,5]

sentiment of the news article's title
Number of

A number that measures how many

Shares

users posted the news article

Fake

A number that represents whether

[0, size of network]

0 if real and 1 if fake

the news article is fake news or real
news
Tick

A number that represents a

[0, number of ticks]

timestamp of when the news article
was posted

2.3.5. Network Structure
We use the Erdos-Renyi model to generate random graphs for the network, as this step has been
utilized in earlier models (Törnberg, 2018). However, since our social network has more
characteristics that account for particular types of users and the features of the news articles
themselves, we want to ensure that the properties of the generated network mimic the properties
of a real social network entirely. In earlier studies, the two main properties used to model an
online social network are the small-world property and the Power-law distribution of
connections. The small-world property is where a node can potentially reach any other node in

21

the graph using only a few hops. The Power-Law property implies a categorization of nodes
where only a few nodes have high connectivity over others, considered influencer nodes in the
network. Therefore, we model the distribution of the network edges to follow a Pareto
distribution where the user nodes with high connectivity will always be significantly less than the
users who have low connectivity. We also account that the network has small-world property and
does not have many isolated communities with no connectivity. To satisfy the previously
mentioned properties, we examine the value of α that needs to be set for the Pareto distribution.
In our settings where the network size is tested between 50-200, we have found that a=5 and m =
5 was the setting that gave consistent results with our network size. We repeated the experiment
for more than 1000 runs for the previous stages, and the resulting networks had always satisfied
the earlier properties.
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑒 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑎 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑎 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑎𝑤 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑎𝑚𝑎
𝑃(𝑥) = 𝑎+1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑎 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒
𝑥
2.4. Validation
In this step, we ensure that the agents’ behavior is modeled in a process that conforms with the
expected behavior of users and news agencies. And the propagation of news articles follows
algorithmic approaches that are implemented in large social media corporations.
2.4.1. The precision of Implementation and Internal Validity
During the model development, randomly chosen users were observed over time. Their news
articles and preferences were tracked and compared to ensure that the desired agent behavior and
news generation were implemented correctly. Animations of the distribution of regular user
preferences over time were inspected over many runs to ensure that the network behavior
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corresponds to the design. Many of the model parameters were varied throughout their range of
values to validate the expected model behavior. As for internal validity, we have compared the
results of different stochastic simulations that have used other random seeds for news agency ratio,
news reliability, and probability of generating fake news (Xiang et al., 2005). The previous tests
validate our implementation of the agent-based model described earlier.
2.4.2. Model Validity
An empirical study of sentiment analysis on previous fake news datasets was conducted to ensure
the correctness of the model-generated news articles. We have used multiple libraries that generate
sentiment (TextBlob: Simplified Text Processing — TextBlob 0.16.0 Documentation, n.d.;
Thelwall et al., 2010). The parameters for generating fake news were also compared to the standard
features described in counterfeit news detection literature that has focused on reaching the
linguistic characteristics of fake news and real news.
2.4.3. News Article Features Validity
Fake news tends to use more extreme title sentiments (Rubin et al., 2016). To capture this feature,
we recreated the FakeNewsNet dataset (Shu et al., 2019). Due to the privacy policies of Twitter
(Privacy Policy, n.d.), the exact dataset cannot be fully recovered as there are tweets that have
either been deleted or denied public access. As for the dataset used in this validation, the recovered
dataset comprised 21,232 tweets where 949 were verified via Politifact and 20,283 were verified
via Gossipcop from the original authors FakeNewsNet. The reason for potentially not being able
to recover the entire dataset is due to tweets being deleted over time.
We narrow the study on the FakeNewsNet dataset to include the tweets containing a specific
publish date to validate fake news and real news percentages. We find 266 fake tweets and 158
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real tweets cited by Politifact, 8,789 fake tweets, and 3,488 real tweets cited by Gossipcop. After
filtering out the tweets that did not include a publish date, the dataset has 12701 tweets in total,
where 8,947 were fake, and 3,754 were real, splitting the dataset into two groups depending on the
fact-checking site verifies if the tweet is fake news or real news.
From the FakeNewsNet data, we find that the tweets in the last three months of collecting the
data in November were around 30-40% containing fake tweets. However, that number reduces to
an average of 20% for the other months of 2020. Another observation we see is that fake news
usually has a different mean of sentiment than real news. And when we conducted further analysis
on all the news in 2020, we found out that fake news tends to have a more negative sentiment than
real news on average.
2.5. Fighting Fake News
We design our model to monitor each news article’s diffusion across the network as it starts from
one news agency. Multiple news articles can be created at the same timestamp from numerous
news agencies. The article is initially shared with the news agency’s circle and moves across the
network as long as the platform places it as an article worthy of sharing. Whenever a news agency
wants to share a new event, we create a news article object with a generated sentiment drawn from
sentiment distribution. Then we monitor the number of shares across the network for every step in
the model for all generated articles. Once the number of ticks is reached, we collect the news article
and user data for further analysis. Then, we recreate the network with new users and news agencies
and start the process again. We repeat this process multiple times to eliminate unreliable results
that the model can produce on a single run.
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2.5.1. General Case with no Intervention
In this section, we have searched for multiple ways currently used in research and practice to fight
the spread of fake news. To assess the success of each approach, we compare the mean percentage
of fake news being spread across the network in multiple runs after making enough generations of
data. As for the control case, we use the same hyperparameters throughout the simulation runs.
We only change the intervention parameters each time we have implemented a new policy to
measure its impact. The hyperparameters that we have kept static are the number of users n in the
network, set to 100. This number is considered well above the standard number to generate random
graphs. We have selected the ratio of regular users always to be 90% of the whole network. The
second hyperparameter we have held constant was the number of ticks at which the simulation
ends, which resembles the timestamps at each simulation part. The number of ticks we have set
was 100. The other hyperparameter we kept constant was the probability of an unreliable news
agency producing fake news.
Figure 3 shows the results of simulating with the previous settings in ten consecutive builds.
We have created the simulation for 100 users and 100 ticks and then restarted the simulation with
a new network ten times while keeping the results of sharing fake news and real news. Therefore,
the results of the simulation can be expressed as:
∑𝑖 𝑓𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑
∑𝑖 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑
𝐹𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑟𝑢𝑛
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠
This case resembles our control case, and after 50 consecutive runs, we measured the mean
percentage of fake news shared to be around 41% of the total news.
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Figure 3 News Sharing Results: Control Case

2.5.2. Fact-Checking
We include a service that can fact-check news articles and identify fake news from real news. We
consider a few user acceptance scenarios to fact-checking to study how it can reduce sharing fake
news. These scenarios resemble conservative fact-checking where users rarely accept factchecking and would be considered the worst case, adopted fact-checking which would be regarded
as the average case or most likely. It resembles a small fraction of the users accepting fact-checking
results. The extreme compliance to fact-checking implies that the majority of the users follow factchecking regardless of their beliefs which would be considered the best-case scenario.
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When considering the case of conservative fact-checking, we can see that the intervention has
not successfully reduced the mean percentage of fake news sharing. The user decides to share fake
news, which is slightly influenced by varying the fact-checking acceptance rate from 0% to 15%.
Figure 4 shows the results of 10 consecutive runs with a 10% fact-checking acceptance rate
compared to the original setting of 0%. And the overall difference was negligible.

Figure 4 Fake News Sharing: 0-15% Fact-Checking in 10 runs

We also increased the number of runs to examine if the number of generations affected the
result. Figure 5 displays the fake news mean percentage after 50 runs for each different set of factchecking acceptance rates from 0-15%.
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Figure 5 Fake News Sharing: 0-15% Fact-Checking in 50 runs

When considering the case of expected compliance fact-checking, we examine the case where
fact-checking acceptance rates are in the range of 20-35%. Figure 6 shows the results of 10
consecutive runs with a 10% fact-checking acceptance rate compared to the control case. And the
overall difference was around 13-26%. We can see that the intervention has been successful in
reducing the mean percentage of fake news sharing.
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Figure 6 Fake News Sharing: 20-35% Fact-Checking in 10 runs

We also increased the number of runs to examine if the number of generations affected the
result. The following figure displays the fake news mean percentage after 50 runs for each different
set of fact-checking acceptance rates from 20-35%.

29

Figure 7 Fake News Sharing: 20-35% Fact-Checking in 50 runs

When considering the case of extreme compliance fact-checking, we examine whether factchecking acceptance rates are from 40-100%. The intervention reports on 50 run a significant drop
in fake news sharing to a minimal amount of less than 13%.
In summary, after implementing fact-checking and observing the difference in the mean
percentage of fake news sharing, we see that having a fact-checking acceptance rate between 2030% of the population can significantly impact the mean portion of fake news sharing. Figure 8
below shows the overall results from having a 0% chance of accepting fact-checking to 100%.
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Figure 8 Fake News Sharing: 0-100% Fact-Checking in 50 runs

To analyze the trend for accepting fact-checking, we fit a regression model to understand the
percentage of accepting fact-checking on the mean rate of fake news sharing. The figure below
displays the model along with a 95% confidence interval. The model and its results are explained
in the table below. We can see in table 3 that on a range of fact-checking percentages between 0100%, the fake news percentage decreases at an accelerating rate.
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Table 3 Fact Checking Percentage Model

Coefficients
Term

Value

StdErr

t-value

Fact Checking Percentage^2*** 0.0059223 0.0006389 9.26911

p-value
< 0.0001

Fact Checking Percentage***

-1.04976

0.0661783 -15.8626 < 0.0001

Intercept***

46.6207

1.42802

32.647

< 0.0001

2.5.3. Filtering Extreme News
In this section, we study the intervention made by the platform to include in its recommender a
clause for filtering news that resembles fake news. This means that the platform naively removes
news that looks like fake news. Previous literature notes that high title sentiment and low sharing
numbers are two constant features used to train fake news classifiers. Therefore, we add a clause
in the recommender to not recommend news articles if they do not follow certain thresholds of the
number of shares and title sentiment. There is an exception to allowing spreading news articles
since they all start with one share. Therefore, we included a slight random chance for some articles
to pass the filters to ensure that the network still functions. For the network configurations we have
customized, the intervention does not reduce the mean percentage of fake news shares. We
attempted to change all the different formats of sentiment and number of shares to reduce the mean
fake news sharing percentage.
2.5.4. Misinformation Classification
We use Machine Learning to identify fake news articles. After training the model, the platform
categorizes every recommendation and removes the classified recommendations as fake news.
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The model of choice we have selected is a Support Vector Classification model (SVC) from
the sci-kit learn library which belongs to the Support Vector Machine (SVM) family. The SVC
model has a gamma of scale along with all other features at default settings. The training reported
an average F1 score of 80%, and the model was retrained every time 20% of the runs had finished
in one pass. Figure 9 shows the difference in the mean percentage of fake news sharing when using
a fake news classifier to the control case with no intervention. We can see that implementing a
fake news classifier has decreased the mean percentage, and the mean rate of fake news sharing
after 50 runs was around 23%.

Figure 9 Fake News Sharing: Implementing a Fake News Classifier in 50 runs

2.6. Discussion & Future Work
After analyzing multiple intervention methods, we see that fighting fake news can be achieved on
numerous levels. The first level is educating the users and increasing the chance of accepting fact33

checking. If the measure of accepting fact-checking increases among the population to be 20%,
then there are higher chances of reducing the spread of fake news in an impactful way. The second
level is the platform level, where the platform tries not to circulate articles that are highly likely to
be fake. This can probably be done intelligently by training fake news classifiers and constantly
tuning them to track news trends.
Figure 10 summarizes the approaches we have studied to fight fake news. We see that adopting
one direction can lead to practical results, whether on the user or platform level.

Figure 10 Comparing Multiple Policies of Fighting Fake News

The model has limitations related to its configurations. First, the model has simulated the
spread of fake news and real news, only dismissing all other interactions that happen on social
media. Second, the model does not account for dynamic edge creation or deletion between nodes
nor node generation, or node deletion. Therefore, it considers the network to be a static snapshot
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of a real social network. And the number of ticks of which the network passes by is relatively short
for considering dynamic edge and node additions and removals. Third, the model creates the
network with specific settings and can only be generalized for matching sets in another social
network.
We want to consider the effects of implementing multiple interventions simultaneously and
observe the difference in fake news sharing for future work. We also think the approach of
immunizing the users against fake news was suggested by Brainard (Brainard et al., 2020) to treat
the spread of misinformation the same way as a virus outbreak. This method will change the
platform algorithm to pass along the news that is more likely to be fake and news that is more
likely to be authentic to challenge the user and see if they can learn how not to share fake news.
2.7. Conclusion
In this study, we study multiple interventions that are used to fight fake news. We design a complex
system with agents who could be regular users or new agencies to create or share news articles.
Then we implement interventions that fight fake news by using fact-checking or a fake news
classifier. The results showed that a small group of users accepting fact-checking results could
reduce fake news sharing. Also, implementing a fake news classifier could reduce 50% of fake
news sharing. The contribution here is our methodology, using ABM to investigate strategies that
can fight fake news.
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CHAPTER 3: FIGHTING HEALTH MISINFORMATION ON YOUTUBE
3.1. Background
There are many venues in healthcare where misinformation might significantly impact the
decisions people make for their health. The reasons why this impact is significant are twofold:
First, there is information asymmetry between health professionals and the public, according to
(Liu, Zhang, et al., 2020). This knowledge gap entails that the person who is not a health
professional feels surrounded by the ambiguity that could cloud their judgment. Second, it is
unknown if the common person has high understandability of the content that reaches a level where
the user is engaged with the video (Liu, Susarla, et al., 2020). To further explain a concept, diseases
share common symptoms that could lead to different diagnoses and treatments. Therefore, the
common person might not know how to link the symptoms they are interested in with the correct
disease. This might leave the common person looking for advice seeking more explanations to
comprehend, which can be on social media. This is where misinformation could have a negative
impact on patient outcomes.
For example, daily scientific studies report new updates on the state of the COVID-19 virus;
however, a person who does not have knowledge or experience in the field of medicine might not
be able to be completely informed on the latest updates with the scientific discoveries related to
the virus or the development of its vaccine which added an “infodemic” to the current pandemic
(“How Fake News about Coronavirus Became a Second Pandemic,” 2020). Based on scenarios
similar to the above, the common person will probably seek a simplified explanation of a scientific
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study. The recent “infodemic” has indeed exploited the problem of fake news affecting healthcare
decisions. However, these effects have been taking place even before the pandemic. One example
is the effects of fake news on the hesitation for people to vaccinate. (Carrieri et al., 2019) had
studied the effects of the diffusion of online misinformation on Italy's immunization rates and
found a causal link between misinformation and child immunization rates for all types of vaccines.
Another recent study by (Li et al., 2020) collected videos related to the pandemic and found that
approximately 25% of YouTube videos had misleading information.
Social media is becoming a significant resource for learning about healthcare. People,
nevertheless, might easily get misled into harmful decisions due to the enormous amount of
inaccurate information available. However, individuals seek medical advice/information from
sources other than the formal medical system, and health misconceptions and deception are
nothing new. Since social media platforms have a tremendous potential to reach millions of views,
determining how a popular platform such as YouTube has affected people's interaction with false
medical information or if consumers can correctly judge truthfulness is a critical task. Incorrect
usage of remedies and other medical treatments could be a potential effect of misinformation about
health, leading to severe effects on human well-being even potential fatality. Patients are
increasingly accessing and viewing YouTube for medical information access (Borno et al., 2020).
Patients may want inaccurate or restricted facts and, specifically, may not be informed of or grasp
the merits of diagnostics. Healthcare practitioners from all forms and dimensions of medical
science must recognize medical sources. Our study will discover, examine, and assess the most
significant Bladder and Prostate cancer videos on YouTube. This effort aims to establish a
framework that can be used in fighting misinformation on YouTube. The scope of this study will
be for Bladder and Prostate cancer videos on the YouTube platform due to their popularity.
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Many people might find useful information on social media sites; however, content creators
might have different intentions than educating their audience or simply lack complete and accurate
information. This results in the spread of viral videos that contain inaccurate or even false
information. This misinformation could go beyond the small group surrounding the social media
individually and affect the population. As in the example of the COVID-19 virus, people who do
not believe in wearing masks appearing on social media promoting this idea either directly or
indirectly can increase the possibility of the virus spreading, which can infect more people.
We notice that many videos discuss certain types of cancer on YouTube that have high
viewership numbers. Previous studies have approached this content to find if the videos are
considered fake news/misinformation (Borno et al., 2020; Loeb et al., 2019, 2021) or can be used
for patient education with chronic conditions (Liu, Susarla, et al., 2020; Liu, Zhang, et al., 2020).
3.2. Related Work
Our research project proposes multiple approaches to fighting misinformation on YouTube and
studies whether these approaches can be effective. Previous studies have found that information
on YouTube can vary in quality. The majority of recent studies that have examined the effects of
misinformation on popular social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter have not conducted a
focused examination on YouTube videos. For example, a recent systemic review of COVID-19
misinformation by (Gabarron et al., 2021) has examined 825 records which only 22 studies
remained after screening the abstracts. Only one study examined YouTube videos. The study
which examined YouTube videos was by (Yuksel & Cakmak, 2020) and concluded that there are
high view rates and low-quality information. In the next two sub-sections, we will discuss related
studies that have studied health misinformation on YouTube and the methods taken to fight health
misinformation on YouTube.
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3.2.1. Health Misinformation on YouTube
According to JMIR Medical Education, 50% of the YouTube videos have highlighted potential
risks or prevention programs (Eynde et al., 2019). From the Study by JMIR Medical Education,
only approximately a quarter of the participants talked about diagnostic techniques. Only about
one-third mentioned screening tests. A third of those polled noted treatment alternatives, while
almost a quarter of those polled discussed them. Patients with varying degrees of patient education
may struggle to learn from these videos. As a result, the scarcity of high-quality knowledge and
the fluctuation of perceived credibility are causes for an alarming rise in inappropriate treatment
and medication. All these two variables influence patients' information extraction, information
interpretation, and decision-making mechanisms. Furthermore, trustworthy organizations and
awareness programs should think about posting their clips on YouTube.
Many recent studies have investigated YouTube videos related to types of cancer. (Loeb et al.,
2019) had examined the dissemination of misinformation regarding prostate cancer on YouTube.
The study examined a sample of 115 videos and found that many videos contain “poor-quality
information,” as stated in the patient summary. It is also imperative to mention that some of the
videos have > 100,000 views. Other than information lacking quality, the study notes that there is
also bias towards the screening or treatment, resulting in the authors concluding that YouTube
cannot be a source of prostate cancer information. Another effort by (Loeb et al., 2021) studied
the quality of bladder cancer information on YouTube, where the study examined a sample of 150
YouTube videos. The authors have also concluded that the content is “of moderate to poor quality”
and could contain misinformation. The authors have used two validated instruments to assess the
quality of the videos: DISCERN by (Charnock et al., 1999), which is used for assessing the quality

39

of consumer health information and treatment choices, and PEMAT by (Shoemaker et al., 2014),
which used for the assessment of the quality of patient education materials.
3.2.2. Fighting Health Misinformation on YouTube
Another interesting insight to highlight is discovering useful content on social media that could
help educate patients. (Liu, Zhang, et al., 2020) has investigated the relationship between the
content of YouTube videos related to diabetes with the collective engagement of the user. A term
that estimates the relevancy and popularity of a video to the users, as well as the amount of shared
attention from the audience a video might be able to assemble. The study uses Machine Learning
methods to extract important health-related keywords used to identify whether the video has high
or low content. Then the study examines the relationship between the encoded medical information
and collective engagement. Another related study (Liu, Susarla, et al., 2020) investigates if the
videos on YouTube are compliant to the understandability guidelines recommended on health
education. One key challenge regarding finding understandable and relatable content is that the
Machine Learning algorithms that extract key information from the videos cannot comprehend
medical context.

3.3.

Method

We expect our work to contribute to the health community by helping patients and interested users
find more reliable content on social media that can help increase patient education on types of
cancer that have a high potential of generating misleading information. We plan to collect
YouTube videos that target certain types of cancer. To build on previous studies, we will search
for videos associated with bladder and prostate cancer after collecting the user information
metadata. We aim to learn the types of misinformation by finding features associated with
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information quality related to the DISCERN survey (Charnock et al., 1999). We aim to learn how
to identify videos that include bias towards screening or treatment, an advertisement for a specific
service/product, or information inaccuracy.
We designed the model based on the model used in chapter 2 with extensions and
customizations made specifically for the YouTube platform and the DISCERN framework
(Charnock et al., 1999). Our method remains consistent, creating a CAS that resembles real-life
scenarios when users react to YouTube videos. The agents are the YouTube viewers who respond
to different videos from numerous channels shared by content creators. One of the main differences
in this design is the scoring of misinformation due to the format of the content becoming a video
instead of a social media feed that is made casual browsing. The videos can contain misinformation
approximated by the quality of the information in the video. As for the visibility of the
misinformation score, the simulation hides that information from the agents by design to decide
whether the video is high or low in quality. The users choose to interact with the video by viewing
it if they have not yet, liking it, and commenting on it. User behavior is based on their
characteristics along with the video attributes. A platform recommendation policy distributes the
videos for other users to receive in their home page feed and “to watch” recommendation channel.
As shown in Figure 11, our agent-based model contains three main components: user behavior
based on the user features, YouTube video features, and platform network properties and
recommendation policies, which will be the key factors affecting the spread of misinformation.
Any given user will vary on their willingness to accept and interact with the shared content that is
recommended to them and is presumably aligned with their interests.
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Figure 11 ABM Overview of YouTube Videos Associated with Bladder/Prostate Cancer

Our proposed agent-based model design defines the viewers and content creators as users who
are agents. Users who are viewers watch video content and then decide if it has significant
misinformation or not. The viewer will also decide whether they would interact with the video by
either liking it or subscribing to the content creator’s channel. As for content creators, the channels
are to create and distribute content. Information quality is assumed to vary by channel, and
therefore content creators are assumed to be following certain strategies to maximize viewership
and information quality. Therefore, channels’ credibility will vary as content creators could
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distribute false information if aligned with their strategy. For example, a content creator solely
focused on high quality will create content that might not have significantly fewer views than a
content creator who produces videos with lower information quality and higher interactions with
viewers.
We design the platform as an environment that recommends videos from channels by
examining watch history. Then, we use the insights from our agent-based model to propose
governance policies for regulating the recommendations to reduce or prevent misinformation.
After collecting the data and training the misinformation detection model, we aim to study the
metadata for the videos associated with user feedback. As an initial starting point, we aim to study
viewership, thumbs up/down, and channel subscription as potential indicators for user behavior.
Since previous studies have not addressed the individual user interaction with the videos. We aim
to explore this area by extending our agent-based model into the environment of YouTube.
Since the metadata on each video can be retrieved directly from YouTube. We will design
the ABM to help reproduce different scenarios where individual users view videos based on their
characteristics. Then we will utilize the data generated from the multiple scenarios we have
introduced to find effective methods on which YouTube can recommend videos with a lesser
degree of misinformation than before. Finally, we will examine different scenarios of features
used in YouTube videos and find if certain configurations can decrease user engagement with
videos containing misinformation.
3.3.1. Agent-Based Model Design
In our design, we have accounted for assigning a viewer on YouTube as a common type of
agent. The content creator type will be present as agents; however, top contributors who can
43

affect viewership status will be significantly less than viewers. Each agent type has a different
strategy, and content creators will have varying strategies as well. Content creators will select
either a strategy to maximize viewership, information quality, or a combination of the previous
strategies. Each feature from the user and video is generated through a corresponding distribution
function simulation.
3.3.2. User Features
For the user, we have added a feature that determines the preferences for the user and assumes
that the user’s personal preference will be on a spectrum where the user on one extreme can be
fully in favor of the subject and on the opposite side of the spectrum can be completely opposing
it. The user can also have a neutral stand on the issue or a mild preference. For example, if we
were to create a simulation of financial news, then we assume that every node created in the
network is interested in economic news. The users and news sources that are not interested will
not be considered since both news sources and users are not involved in that subject and do not
want to participate. The primary use of this feature is to extend the theory of the Illusory of Truth
as the user will be likely to believe repetitive news shared in their circles if they happen to share
the same core preferences. Table 4 below explains the main attributes and functions the user has
per our settings.
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Table 4 User Features - Health Misinformation Model

Feature

Description

Range

Unique ID

A unique non-intelligent number

[0, size of network)

used to identify and track agents
Content creation

A probability parameter set for

A number between [0,1] is

probability

determining user video upload

assigned based on whether the

activity on their channel

user is a viewer or content
creator

User preference

A measure that resembles the

A number between [-1,1]

user’s approval or rejection

following the formula of

towards a specific topic

preference. We have set the

discussed on the news. It can be

formula in our simulation runs to

a political inclination, or it can

be:

be the users’ attitude towards

User type

Preference = Extremity *

COVID-19 news.

Direction

Specifies whether the user is a

One type from either ‘viewer’ or

viewer or content creator

‘content creator’
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Table 4, (Continued)

Channel

All the videos that the user has

Videos stored in the user’s

uploaded to the YouTube

collection where a user could

platform

have uploaded a number
between 0 videos and all videos
that have been uploaded

History

All the videos that other users

Videos stored in the user’s

have uploaded to the YouTube

collection where a user could

platform of which the user has

have uploaded a number

interacted with

between 0 videos and all videos
that have been uploaded

User preference setting can be modified in the simulation by varying the distribution of the
preferences where user preference is being sampled. We have specified the settings to model the
distribution based on the extremity of preferences and direction in our settings. Similar to the
User Features section in Chapter 2, the extremity of user preference in our settings has followed
the Gaussian distribution. In general, users’ preferences are less likely to be extreme as a starting
point. We selected this specific model because we wanted to begin the simulation with a
balanced community regarding their preferences. As for the direction of the user preference, we
have chosen a similar approach to the User Features section in Chapter 2 to model it by
following a Bernoulli distribution. As an example of extremity, a user can be highly negative
towards videos that suggest certain type of treatments. And on the opposing side, a person can
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have beliefs that are extremely in favor for a treatment described in a video. These views are
captured where a user either has a positive or negative selection, even if it is a tiny one.
Therefore, the initial distribution of user preferences from the starting point of the simulation is
to be two Gaussian distributions where each Gaussian has a mean on either the positive or
negative end of the preference dimension. The values of the mean μ and standard deviation σ of
the distribution can be altered for a more polarized network of users or a less polarized network
as well.
𝐼𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠, 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠:
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 · 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
(𝑥−𝜇)2
1
−
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑔(𝑥) =
𝑒 2𝜎2
𝜎√2𝜋
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ℎ(𝑥) = 2 · (𝜇 𝑥 (1 − 𝜇)1−𝑥 ) − 1
After modeling user preferences, we create user similarity using the choices of two connected
users to measure the difference between them to determine if a user will likely share a news
article based on the similarity with the other user.
3.3.3. Video Features
Table 5 contains a summary of the features we included for YouTube videos. These attributes are
related to the video content and source relative credibility. As for source credibility, we use the
measured distance in preference between the content creator and the viewer to estimate the
viewer’s perceived credibility of the source. Along with the source preference, we also use the
video’s preference as a secondary measure. Therefore, the user’s interaction with a video is
inversely proportional to the difference in source and video preferences from the user’s
preferences.
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As for the video attributes, we consider the features that have high potential to recommend
videos on the platform. The features that we have found to be most commonly used to identify
high misinformation when training classifiers are the title’s sentiment, duration, the age of the
video, and the number of views. An extreme feeling embedded in the title signals that the video
is made for click-baits and might contain misinformation.
1
△ 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 & 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
1
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 ′ 𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∝
△ 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 & 𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
1
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 ′ 𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∝
| 𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 |
′
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∝ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠

𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 ′ 𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∝

We use a Beta distribution where most video headlines generally do not have an extreme
sentiment; however, in a similar fashion to news headlines, there is a slight chance of a video
having a high sentiment score, whether positive or negative sentiment, as for the number of
shares, likes and dislikes. We have initialized them to 0. At the start of the simulation run, we use
a preference similarity measure to build the number of views, likes and dislikes. Then used a
Bernoulli distribution with a mean of 0.01, which was derived from the sample dataset to assign
likes. We also use the Bernoulli distribution with a mean of 0.004 derived from the sample
dataset to assign dislikes.
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Table 5 Video Features

Feature

Video Id

Description

Range

A unique non-intelligent number

[0, total number of all news

used to identify and track news

articles)

articles
Source Id

A unique non-intelligent number

[0, size of network)

was used to identify and track the
agent whom the article originated
from
Source

A measure that resembles the

A number between [-1,1] following

Preference

source’s approval or rejection

the formula of preference. We have

towards a specific topic discussed

set the formula in our simulation

on the news.

runs to be:
Preference = Extremity * Direction

Video Preference A measure that resembles the

A number between [-1,1] following

video’s inclination towards a

the formula of preference. We have

specific topic that is being

set the formula in our simulation

discussed.

runs to be:
Preference = Extremity * Direction

49

Table 5, (Continued)

Duration

A variable that describes the length

A number sampled from an

of a YouTube video in seconds

exponential distribution taken from
the sample videos with a mean of 5
and a standard deviation of 600

Sentiment

A number that measures the

[-5,5]

sentiment of the news article's title
Number of

A number that measures how many

Views

users clicked on and viewed the

[0, size of network]

video
Number of Likes

A number that measures how many

[0, size of network]

users clicked the like button on the
video
Number of

A number that measures how many

Dislikes

users clicked the dislike button on

[0, size of network]

the video
Misinformation

A number that represents whether
the misinformation score on a 5-

1: No Misinformation
2: Very Little
3: Moderate

point Likert scale

4: High
5: Extreme
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Table 5, (Continued)

Tick

A number that represents a

[0, number of ticks]

timestamp of when the news article
was posted

3.3.4. Network Structure and the YouTube Recommender
YouTube as a platform has a unique type of interactivity that is different than other popular
social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. In a general setting, a social media
network should be structured based on an exponential distribution of connectivity followed in
previous designs, whether the structure was an Erdos-Renyi model (Törnberg, 2018) or similar.
The main differences in the network structure of YouTube are described as clicks, watchtime,
survey responses, and likes/dislikes/shares that drive the recommendation engine (On YouTube’s
Recommendation System, n.d.). According to the VP of Engineering at YouTube, clicks are
described as the signals the user produces to the network due to their activity: the videos they
click on to view, the videos they click on the like button to signal that they have enjoyed. The
videos they clicked on the dislike button to signal that they would probably not want to watch a
similar video. As for watchtime, it can be described as the history of the videos watched and the
duration of which the videos have been watched. Therefore, the recommendations that the user
receives depend on their activity. There is no capability to message other users or create groups
of people that directly resemble a specific community.
With the differences mentioned earlier between the YouTube platform and other common
platforms, we have maintained the structure of having only a few highly connected individuals,
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the main content creators. In the YouTube platform, these users will be a significantly small
number of users with a high number of subscribers and a relatively high number of views. The
process of creating the network and simulation the diffusion of videos in a general setting
without implementing any interventions is described in Table 6 describes the process of creating
each user in the network.
As for the detailed process for creating a user, each user is assigned a unique identifier to
track their actions across the simulation. Then, the general user behavior is determined by
assigning them either a viewer role or a content creator role. The reason why the assignment is
predetermined is to normalize the behavior of content creation and focus the simulation on
tracking misinformation behavior. Therefore, we limit the network from generating a scenario
where all users create videos or do not participate in creating content.
Table 7 lists the hyperparameters used in the simulation. The hyperparameters are used to
ensure that creating users, creating videos, and recommending created videos runs within
boundaries that resemble a real platform.
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Table 6 YouTube Network Generation

ALGORITHM 1.

YouTube Network Generation and Video Diffusion

Input: A network graph G
Output: A network graph G with connected users U and distributed videos V
Procedures:
For every iteration
1.

Clear network graph G

2.

Create new users U and set overall user behavior

3.

Create user-similarity-mapping based on users’ preferences

4.

For every tick t
For every user u
Create a video based on u’s content creation behavior
Get platform recommended videos V based on clicks and watchtime
Each video vϵV updates number of views based on u clicks
Each video vϵV updates number of likes based on u clicks
Each video vϵV updates number of dislikes based on u clicks
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Table 7 YouTube Network ABM Hyperparameters

Hyperparameter

Description

Range

Name

Recommended
Range

Number of users

Determines the size of the network

[1, ∞)

[50, 200]

Number of ticks

Determines the length of the

[1, ∞)

[100, 1000]

(0, 1)

[0.9-0.99]

(0, 1)

[0.01-0.1]

(0, 1)

[0.1-0.3]

(0, 1)

[0.1-0.3]

simulation
Probability of a user

Denotes the chances of the user being

being a viewer

a casual user who uses the platform to
watch videos

Probability of a user

Denotes the chances of the user being

being a content

a person who uses the platform to

creator

create videos and gather views/likes. It
should be complementary to the
viewer probability

User similarity

Determines whether two users have

threshold

similar preferences

User to the video

Determines whether a user and the

similarity threshold

content of a specific video have
similar preferences
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Table 7, (Continued)

Probability of

The chances of a user clicking on the

viewing a video

view to watch it

Probability of

The chances of a user clicking the

clicking like

“like” button

Probability of

The chances of a user clicking the

clicking dislike

“dislike” button. It is usually less than

(0, 1)

[0.05-0.15]

(0, 1)

[0.005-0.015]

(0, 1)

[0.002-0.006]

(0, 1)

[0.002-0.006]

[0, ∞)

[50,500]

the probability of clicking “like”
Probability of

The chances of a user subscribing to

subscribing

another user’s channel. It is usually
less than the number of likes since it
requires the user to

Classifier retraining

The model specifies the number of

period

ticks needed to pass to retrain the
misinformation classifier

3.4. Validation
We ensure that each of the agents has behavior characteristics captured in user and video creation
processes, which aligns with the expected behavior of YouTube users. We also ensure that the
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video creation, recommendation, and interaction follow a design that mimics prior literature results
and current data retrievals we have conducted from YouTube.
3.4.1. The precision of Implementation and Internal Validity
The process for determining the accuracy of implementation is similar to the general model in
Chapter 2. Randomly chosen users and their channels and history were observed over time to
ensure that users create content, other users are viewing the content, and the videos that have an
interaction were recorded and tracked. As for user preferences, users with similar preferences were
tracked and compared to ensure that the initial recommendation setup was accurate and
implemented correctly. In a similar validation check to the general model, many of the model
hyperparameters were varied throughout their range of values to ensure the expected model
behavior. As for the validity of some of the important measures in the model, we have examined
the rate of views to misinformation and model duration on 100 model runs to ensure the rate
mimics prior literature statistics. Table 8 demonstrates the number of views of the high
misinformation rate of videos in prior literature.
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Table 8 Number of Views to High Misinformation Rate in Prior Literature

Paper Title and Authors

High Misinformation Rate %

Dissemination of Misinformative and Biased 20
Information about Prostate Cancer on YouTube
(Loeb et al., 2019)
Quality of Bladder Cancer Information on 19
YouTube
(Loeb et al., 2021)
Racial disparities and online health information: 7
YouTube and prostate cancer clinical trials (Borno
et al., 2020)
Pelvic organ prolapse on YouTube: evaluation of

18

consumer information (Herbert et al., 2020)
Radiotherapy
Qualitative

or

Surgery?

Assessment

of

Comparative, Radiotherapy ~17%
Online

Patient Surgery ~62%

Education Materials on Prostate Cancer (Vu et al.,
2021)
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Figure 12 demonstrates the misinformation rate generated for all 100 runs. The
misinformation rate is the number of views for misinformation videos to the number of views to
all related videos. The 95% confidence interval for the mean of the rate is between (0.25, 0.27).

Figure 12 Distribution of Misinformation Rate on 100 Runs

As for the validity of generating video durations that resemble real YouTube videos (n=195)
related to the topics of interest, we have retrieved a dataset of YouTube videos that respond to
the query “bladder cancer” and have determined the distribution of the duration of the videos.
Then we compared the simulated distribution of video lengths to the original video lengths
retrieved from the dataset, which we show in figure 13 that compares video durations.
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Figure 13 Comparison of Video Duration Between YouTube Dataset and Generated Videos

To ensure that the video duration distributions are similar, we conduct a two-sided
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for goodness of fit. The test could not reject the null hypothesis with a
p-value of 0.24, thus concluding that the two distributions are similar. We have also repeated the
sampling with the same mean and standard deviation for generating the video durations. A p-value
remains insignificant, with approximately the same value ranging between (0.18-0.3).
3.4.2. Model Validity
To ensure correct execution of each part of the model functionality, we have conducted unit tests
on user creation, video creation for a user, and video recommendations. We have found that on
multiple hundreds of runs that the functionality of each component produces similar outputs. As
for user creation, the ratio of viewers to content creators remained within the expected ratio of
9.5:0.5. As for the distribution of user preference, figure 14 shows a sample of the distribution of
user preference which remained consistent under multiple runs.
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Figure 14 Distribution of User Preferences

As for validation of video creation functionality, we have tracked the channels of randomly
selected users to ensure that the users have been creating videos and posting them to their
respective channels. As for video recommendations, we have tracked the history of randomly
selected users to verify that the users have been interacting with certain videos. The platform
captured the interactions by saving the videos properly in the user history. For validating network
edges and connectivity, we have verified that the users in which a certain user has videos stored in
their history have been connected with them in the network graph.
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3.5. Fighting Health Misinformation
In this section, we will investigate a variety of scenarios that would reduce the ratio of number of
views to high misinformation produced in the general settings discussed in the model design.
3.5.1. Misinformation Classifier – General Case
In the following setting, we train a classifier to predict whether a video contains high
misinformation by sampling the videos from previous time steps and retraining the classifier on a
specified number of iterations. We introduce a new parameter that specifies the period of which
the classifiers need retraining. We have trained three different types for the classifiers: Random
Forest, XGBoost, and Gaussian Naïve Bayes to avoid training a single model, which could lead
to predictions implied by the model bias. Table 9 describes the algorithm we developed to train
the classifiers and use them in video recommendations. We noticed during training the classifiers
a consistent case of an imbalance in the labels where the data for high misinformation have
always had a lower number of observations than the observations with low misinformation.
Therefore, we have added an oversampling strategy to create a balanced dataset for model
training.

61

Table 9 Algorithm for Deploying a Misinformation Classifier

ALGORITHM 2.

Deploy a Misinformation Classifier

Input: A dataset df of features from tk-p-tk where k is the current timestamp and p is the period
of which the classifier needs retraining
Output: A binary classifier clf that predicts if a video contains high misinformation
Procedures:
For every classifier retraining period p:
1.

Collect all videos from tk-p-tk

2.

Select model features {source preference, video preference, sentiment of the title,
number of views, number of likes, number of dislikes}

3.

Transform features using MinMax Scaler

4.

Relabel the target variable to a binary variable where misinformation score > 2
equals 1; otherwise, misinformation equals 0

5.

Oversample the minority class of having high misinformation

6.

Split the data into training and testing

7.

Train three different types of classifiers (Random Forest, XGBoost, Gaussian
Naïve Bayes)

8.

Evaluate each classifier on the test data using the harmonic mean F1-score

9.

Deploy the classifier with the highest F1-score

10.

Predict of each recommendation has high misinformation, and remove the videos
with a prediction of high misinformation

The metric of evaluation we chose for this case is the harmonic mean F1-Score. The
score is considered more balanced than other known classification scores, such as accuracy,
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because it considers the precision and recall of the model in its calculation. The formula for the
F1-score can be written in the following equation.
𝐹1 = 2 ∗

𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑇𝑃
=
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑇𝑃 + 1 (𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)
2

After running the simulation using the same hyperparameter settings with the only addition of
the classifier training, we have not noticed a significant difference in the misinformation rate. We
have also noticed that the F1-score was usually in favor of tree-based classification methods,
specifically, Random Forest. We have also noticed that varying the classifier training time did not
change the misinformation rate. This conclusion implies two things: First, the classification score
is not high enough to impact the video recommendations potentially. Second, the data inputs for
the classifier do not provide enough information to improve the learning of the classifier. We have
also trained a neural network classifier to predict whether a video contains high misinformation by
undergoing a similar process previously mentioned. However, the F1 score resulting from
deploying the neural net classifier was very similar, with a 95% confidence interval for the mean
of the misinformation rate is between (0.22, 0.28).
3.5.2. Spammer Identification via Content Creator’s Channel
In the following setting, we aim to label certain users as spammers, who we define in this context
as users who create videos that have been previously labeled as high misinformation. This can be
achieved by finding users who have created content that contained high misinformation by
sampling user channels from previous time steps and assessing a misinformation score to the
user’s channel. In our approach, we have assigned users who have created high misinformation
content as spammers and lowered the recommender ranking results of their videos at the top of
the recommendation list. Table 10 demonstrates the algorithm for identifying spammers.
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Table 10 Identifying Spammers via Content Creators' Channel

ALGORITHM 3.

Identifying Spammers via Content Creators’ Channel

Input: A dataset df of features from tk-p-tk where k is the current timestamp and p is the period
of which new videos will be examined
Output: A list of users who have been identified as creators of high misinformation videos S
Procedures:
Define a spammer threshold st
For every period p:
1.

Collect all videos from tk-p-tk

2.

For each user u:
Find user’s channel videos
Calculate the mean of misinformation found in a user’s previous channel µ
If µ > st, then mark the user as a spammer and them to S

3.

Postpone recommendations on new videos from S during tk -tk+p

During 100 runs, we have noticed a more impactful decrease in misinformation views rate,
wherein the rate dropped below 10% in a few cases. A percentage that has never been achieved
during the general setting or when deploying a classifier. However, we have also noticed that in
other cases, the rate of misinformation has increased, albeit this has been far less. The 95%
confidence interval for the mean of the rate is between (0.2, 0.22). Figure 15 highlights the
distribution of misinformation rate when the platform identifies spammers.
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Figure 15 Distribution of Misinformation Rate with Spammer Identification

We have attempted to vary a few hyperparameters of the simulation to ensure the consistency
of the output and examine that no parameter changes would be considered external effects that
would change the misinformation rate. For example, we have varied the spammer identifier
threshold, and we noticed that the misinformation ratio started to increase only when the threshold
was increased from 0.5 to 0.8. The increase in this parameter allows for accepting more users as
non-spammers; therefore, the chances of recommending videos with high misinformation
increases. It is important to note that the original settings of the hyperparameters that were set to
establish the diffusion of videos and recommendations have not been changed. These parameters
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include the probabilities of viewing, liking, and disliking a video, and along with the thresholds
that are set to recommend based on user preference similarity.
3.5.3. Spammer Identification via History of Misinformation Victims
In the following setting, we aim to find certain users who could be victims of misinformation.
These are users who get recommendations of videos with high misinformation and have
interacted with the videos. Therefore, we verify the user’s history to detect if the user has a
pattern of vulnerability to misinformation. Then we score a user's vulnerability to
misinformation, assessing a misinformation score to the user’s channel. After scoring the users,
we find the content creators to whom they have subscribed and examine their videos via their
channel. If the videos contained high misinformation, then we label the content creators as a
spammer.
During 100 runs, we have not noticed a slight decrease in the misinformation views rate from
the general setting. The 95% confidence interval for the mean of the rate is between (0.24, 0.27).
Figure 16 highlights the distribution of misinformation rate when the platform identifies
spammers using a user's history. We have also jointly combined the spammer identification
methods previously used to identify spammers using channel history and user history. There was
a slight decrease in the misinformation rate's 95% confidence interval, which was between
(0.22,0.25).
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Figure 16 Distribution of Misinformation Rate with Spammer Identification via User History

3.6. Discussion & Future Work
After investigating several approaches to reduce misinformation on cancer videos on YouTube,
we find that the nature of misinformation videos related to healthcare on YouTube is unique for
many reasons. The first reason is due to the nature of the YouTube platform. The platform is
designed to create and share content casually and informally, and it is also designed not to allow
direct messaging and group interaction. These factors result in a very specific relationship between
the content creator and the regular user. This relationship ultimately depends on the content
creator’s channel power via the number of views, likes, and dislikes each video generates.
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Given that the content creator is incentivized to increase the number of views and interactions,
it is inherent that videos will be created not only by experts but also by participants from the public.
This results in generating more videos that discuss a critical subject such as Bladder Cancer with
the reliance on the audience and the platform to make decisions about the quality of the content.
Second, the amount of interaction that YouTube videos related to serious health issues such as
cancer has a smaller number of views and interactions than other viral videos on YouTube. While
viral videos might reach millions in views, the number of views considered on the higher end of
viewership for Bladder and Prostate Cancer was hundreds of thousands. This implies that the
general approaches to fighting fake news, such as training classifiers on millions of observations
reaching a high accuracy rate, are considered challenging for deploying a highly accurate classifier
on the Cancer videos using only the features used in this study. This explains why the spammer
identification approach was more successful than the classifier approach. The spammer
identification process decreases the ranking of the channels considered distributors of
misinformation, thus eliminating an entire section of the recommendations based on user
similarity.
Identifying spammers based on previous behavior had not shown major success compared to
training classifiers when the social network was highly dependent on user connectivity and
messaging, which is more resembled in Facebook or Twitter. For this type of content on a platform
such as YouTube, for a user to reach higher numbers of views, we have seen that the account the
user establishes must establish a high number of subscribers for its videos to reach a large number
of audiences consistently. Therefore, the misinformation on such a platform would be more likely
to the knowledge gap between medical professionals and the public and the comparatively thin
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marginal incentives medical experts would receive to create highly informative video content that
would help improve patient education.
The model has limitations related to its configurations and hyperparameter settings. First, the
model has simulated the spread of misinformation based on sampled data of the spread of Bladder
and Prostate Cancer on YouTube, requiring reconfiguration if applied on a different platform.
Second, the model does not account for user comments, which we have implemented due to the
few comments found on the sampled videos. The majority of the comments were congratulatory
in nature, where the audience thanked the video uploaders. Third, the videos' linguistic features
were considered an approximation of the quality of the video based on the distribution of
misinformation that has been consistently produced in prior literature in medical journals
specialized in Urology. We want to expand our agent-based model by incorporating word
embeddings of the video transcripts to quantify misinformation in future designs.
3.7. Conclusion
This study proposes different intervention strategies to fight misinformation on YouTube videos
related to Bladder and Prostate Cancer. We design a complex system with agents who could be
regular users named viewers or content creators who upload videos to YouTube. Then we
implement various settings that decrease misinformation rate by training classifiers and
systematically identifying spammers. The results show that examining user channels and
identifying spammers was the most effective strategy under the current settings. Our research
contributes to the methodology of using ABM to investigate strategies that can fight
misinformation.
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CHAPTER 4: CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This chapter discusses contributions and limitations and proposes future research ideas applied to
the fake news diffusion framework. We suggest a few extensions that the dissertation can
contribute to and present our view regarding potential domains that can be contributed using the
framework designed in the current dissertation. We also raise the encountered shortcomings of our
current efforts, suggest how they can be addressed, and how future modifications can potentially
improve the general framework and its applications.
In this dissertation, we have studied misinformation diffusion on multiple social media settings
and analyzed a few strategies that can be implemented to reduce the effects of spreading
misinformation. We have designed a complex system that simulates the diffusion of
misinformation in a general setting. We also have extended the design to a specific case which is
healthcare misinformation videos on YouTube. Our research contributes to studying
misinformation by providing a framework customized to a certain setting that fits a social media
platform, whether the social media platform is hypothetical or based on sampled observations from
an existing platform. Therefore, our method not only contributes to the body of research via its
results, but it also provides the mechanism of future research efforts to utilize our design to either
incorporate in or extend upon their studies.
As for the contribution to the sources of fake news diffusion, we have examined the effects of
fake news with extreme headlines shifting users’ preferences over time. This issue is a drawback
of the otherwise brilliant capability of connecting millions of people through a social media
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platform. Therefore, we believe that our work would help future studies further examine why
having increasingly polarized opinionated users that utilize their network connections to spread
unreliable information that could lead to even higher polarity among user groups.
As for the contribution to fighting health misinformation, we based our model design on a
sample dataset of YouTube videos that discuss symptoms and treatments of Bladder and Prostate
Cancer. Not only did we extend the model to reproduce a matching environment of which the
videos’ attributes currently hold, but we also modeled a few intervention strategies to assess if a
certain strategy would be comparatively more effective than another within a specific situation.
As for the limitations of our model design, our model considers the network properties inferred
about the users, which might not match a specific group of users that could spread misinformation.
This implies that the model would require a revision to its design if the network properties are
substantially different than the general setting. Another limitation that must be considered is the
recommendation engine that we reproduce in our model settings. The news recommender engine
in a social media platform might take into consideration other features that we have not
implemented such as demographic information, user applications that are connected to the
platform, user responses to survey data, and user tracking information such as their mobile
information that is obtained by consenting to the social media platform being installed on the user’s
smartphone.
Finally, for future research, we would like to extend the capability of recommending videos to
include the sequential activity of users. We believe that studying how users interact with a cascade
of fake news and reals in a mass network setting could lead to new intervention strategies that
could be useful to decrease fake news diffusion. We would also like to include linguistic features
derived from text, such as entities that locations can extract, people, objects, or other types of
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entities. We would also like to examine the image and video features that could explain
misinformation diffusion phenomena. Another potential area that we can investigate is to model
users who share fake news by their intention, as some users might share fake news without
knowing it is not true, however, other users could be intentionally knowing they are sharing fake
news but have decided to spread their opinions on the world even if the events shared were not
factual. Another area to consider in future work is the tradeoff between platform incentives and
regulations. Lastly, we would like to consider incorporating the three E’s (which are Engineering,
Education, and Enforcement) as a performance management tool for social media news sharing.
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